Mere Equity Definition
Apart from this list compiled by David Wright, does anyone have any clues as to how I can determine from a real situation when a right to a claim can be classified as mere equity? Or should the above list suffice? I am concerned that there are other cases where a claim to a claim is classified as mere equity. I still don`t know when a claim to a claim is simple equity. Of course, in the case of Latec, something was clear that it really could not be called simply interests of an exclusive or personal nature in the fullest sense. Should that be the rule of thumb? This book will examine the nature of the just claim known as “mere equity.” The fundamental characteristics of simple fairness are well established. A simple right of equity is “protected by copyright” in the sense that it can be enforced against certain third parties and sold for the benefit of certain third parties. However, despite its exclusive taste, mere equity does not represent an interest in a property to which it relates. The main consequence of this is that a simple share capital is transferred to a legal or equitable interest, which is then acquired at the value and without notice of the simple capital. Although the essential characteristics of pure actions are regulated, there is considerable confusion as to the underlying legal nature and practical function of these claims. This confusion has led to criticism that naked actions are an anomalous category and has raised the question of whether naked actions should even exist as a legal concept. This state of affairs is manifestly unsatisfactory, especially since mere actions are the accepted basis of a significant number of just doctrines, including resignation, correction, and forfeiture of property. This thesis aims to demystify simple actions. It will appear that the existing scientific literature has not sufficiently addressed the concept of simple justice. It will then review key legal documents to fill conceptual gaps.
In short, the thesis will argue that a simple right to equity is a just right of action: a simple claim for a particular equitable remedy against a particular defendant. Mere equity is therefore a right in personam โ a claim that binds a narrow and certain category of persons โ although it has been extended to third parties on the basis of the principles of equity. The identification of these principles will be a major concern of the work. Look at this and look on the page for the term “equity” as it is used in context.www.sjrm.com/articles/wjr02.htm Now that I`ve read it again, it seems that the Latec decision contains three different analyses of simple actions. Hotel Terrigal was initially able to exercise its “equity of repayment” (the right to return the mortgaged property after repayment of the money corresponding to the mortgage holder) if it had asserted the claim 5 years earlier as a mortgage debtor, meaning that the mortgagee had a reasonable property right in the restitution of the property after paying the principal amount. interest and fees of the mortgagee. Thus, he was able to force the mortgagee to transfer the land after paying the debt. So they had a property right 5 years ago, but when they made the claim, 5 years had passed and by filing a complaint 5 years later, the right of Hotel Terrigals was difficult to determine.
Menzies J. stated that the various statements of the other two judges could be resolved as follows: if the question is whether the security interest is transferable, then the right to cancel a fraudulent transfer contains sufficient ownership information to be assignable in fair interest. However, if it is a priority conflict, it is considered a simple equity that requires the court`s assistance to perfect it, and it does not take precedence over full capital such as the interest of a fair mortgagee. I think what I need to do now is determine when a party has equity, which is just equity and not personal or adequate equity. I think my problem was to determine when a party had a simple personal or patrimonial equity after the fact, and not at the time they made their claim, because it is important here, not after a curial declaration has been made – it is easy afterwards, but it is more difficult to know what right the person has at the time of making his claim. Because it can be as simple as a personal right or a property right, and not a simple equity, which can be of a personal or patrimonial nature. I do not understand the concept of “simple justice”. “It is not a right of property, but a right of the nature of a law chosen in action, subordinated to a right of property”?? Wells, Jack (2019) What is Simple Equity?: An Examination of the Nature and Function of So-called “simple actions.” PhD thesis, University of York.
In the case of a non-recourse debt, the debt is secured on the property itself without recourse to the designated owner. If the property is sold (e.g. at the time of redemption) at a price lower than the value of the debt, the loss is borne by the owner of the debt. In the case of recourse debts, the debt is that of the personally designated owner and in full; generally satisfied when selling the property between the debtor and the financial institution. The choice of initial incorporation is often to anticipate tax liabilities at the time of the eventual sale โ but in UK practice, financial “negative equity” can also remain with the debtor. This has tax implications on profits and capital losses for tax purposes. In Australia.You are on the right track. Mere capital is not a reasonable interest. Rather, it is the right to exercise the just jurisdiction of the courts.
The High Court`s decision in LatecInvestments v. Hotel Terrigal is a good case on this issue. I understand the terms “fair property rights” and “personal shares,” but after consulting several texts, I have great difficulty determining when simple equity exists and when it does not. It`s easy for the other two, but simple justice seems confusing. A binding contract of sale confers a reasonable interest on the purchaser of the land in accordance with the rule set out in Lysaght v. Edwards.[7] Similarly, Walsh v. Lonsdale ruled that “fairness is considered to be done as what should be done.” [8] A contract which does not meet the requirements of an act required by the Property Act 1925 ยง 52 (1) may be expressly performed in order to transfer the fair interest to the new purchaser. This rule has had important implications, as it allows interests not conveyed by an act to bind prospective buyers by the doctrine of implied notification. However, the UK Parliament mitigated the effects of this rule through the Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s.2,[9] which requires that all contracts for the sale of land (which may be expressly enforceable) be in writing, contain all the terms of the agreement and must be signed by both parties. Contracts that are not in writing and signed by both parties cannot be expressly executed and therefore do not create or transfer a reasonable interest in the land. A reasonable interest is an “interest held on the basis of an equitable title (a security that indicates an economic interest in the property and entitles the holder to acquire a formal title) or that is asserted for reasons of equity, such as the interest of a trust beneficiary.” [1] The right to participate is a right to equity that can be protected by a fair remedy.
This concept exists only in systems influenced by the common law tradition (connotation 2), such as New Zealand, England, Canada, Australia and the United States. I read the first few lines of your article and decided to try another reading of Latec Investments. I had read Justice Taylor`s decision and it made sense, but I did not understand the other judges. I then re-read other lecture notes on this topic from other universities (thanks Google) and I think I understand what “mereequities” are, especially after coming back and reading the parts of your post that I hadn`t read before, your post seemed to be a summary of the lecture notes I had read, so I think I`m confident, that I know what simple fairness is, but I thought I`d publish it here anyway, just in case I`m wrong: if payments have been made for real estate debts that correspond only to the service of the debt and not to the repayment of the principal, the owner of this property without an increase in value cannot have real equity, but only “simple equity” – the right to exercise or accept the choice of sale. I think the difficulty lies in determining the rights that are qualified as simple shares, first of all to be able to determine whether the party has simple equity of a personal or patrimonial nature.