Law Is a Command of Sovereign Austin

The imperative theory of law in its simplest terms can be defined as “command of the sovereign by sanction”. The imperative theory asserts that law is what the political sovereign of a particular state says is the law. This law must be supported by legitimate sanctions, i.e. sanctions or sanctions for violations. 1.Sovereign: Sovereign means higher political authority and higher political authority can be a king in the monarchical system while a parliament can be a higher political authority in the parliamentary system of government. According to Austin, the law is the imperative of the sovereign, and if there is no sovereign, then there is no law, because legislative power is vested in the sovereign. Another criticism of Austin`s theory of command is that a theory that presents law solely in terms of power does not distinguish the rules of terror from forms of government with such precision that they are accepted by their own citizens as legitimate (or at least as a reason for acting). “The law is the command of the sovereign,” says the famous jurist John Austin in his theory of command. Austin, in his theory of command, described “the law is the order of a ruler supported by sanctions,” meaning that the law is made by the sovereign body of the state, and if someone does not obey the law, then the state will punish him for ignoring the sovereign`s order. Since it is a commandment, each law, which is actually called that, derives from a specific source. Whenever an order is issued or implied, one party signals a desire that another should or should not do, and the latter is abhorrent for an evil that the former intends to cause if the wish is not heeded.

The key to a law called this is obligation. Any desire regarding behavior is favorable to desired behavior and unfavorable to undesirable behavior. Such desires may arise from instructions or a general opinion, but desires, which are guidelines, differ in that they make behavior binding. General opinion cannot give rise to obligations. Each directive is then a command; The threat of evil is a punishment, and the party commanded and threatened has an obligation or a duty. Duty and sanction are correlative, and fear of sanctions is the reason for the obligation. Positive law consists of commandments established by a sovereign (or his agents) to oppose other legislators, such as the general commandments of God and the general commandments of an employer to an employee. First, in many societies it is difficult to identify a “sovereign” in Austin`s sense (a difficulty Austin himself experienced when he was forced to awkwardly describe the British “sovereign” as the combination of the King, the House of Lords, and all the voters of the House of Commons). Moreover, the emphasis on a “sovereign” makes it difficult to explain the continuity of legal systems: a new ruler will not come with the kind of “obedience habit” that Austin sets as a criterion for the decision-maker of a system. 2. Revocation Law: Austin does not treat these laws as orders because they are intended to revoke an order.

2nd commandment: The order of sovereign political authority is order and binds everyone. Austin`s theory of command, however, was more influential than Bentham`s, as his jurisprudential writings did not appear in an almost systematic form until long after Austin`s work was published, with Bentham`s most systematic discussion appearing posthumously, in the late 20th century (Bentham 1970, 1996; Cotterrell 2003: p. 50). Now it is clear that the law is the sovereign`s imperative, but with the following example, it will be clearer that the law is the sovereign`s command, backed by sanctions. He limited his field of study to positive law only. Professor Allen thinks it`s fair to call the Austin school an imperative school. He gave this name based on Austin`s legal opinion – “Law is Command”. Austin`s first task is to be a critical analysis of the law as it is. In his first six lectures, he tried to explain law, and his conception of law is an imperative based on sovereignty. According to him, the law is only a set of individual laws. According to him, all laws are rules, most of which govern behavior.

Now it is clear that the law is the sanctioned commandment, where sovereign means supreme political authority and everyone must follow this law that was made by him. If someone has not followed, that person will be punished. The law is binding and binding and has the sanction to apply the laws. In the above criteria, Austin managed to distinguish law and legal rules from religion, morality, conventions, and customs. However, customary law (unless the sovereign has directly or indirectly adopted these customs as law), international law and parts of constitutional law are also excluded from “jurisprudence”. (These exclusions alone would make Austin`s theory problematic for most modern readers.) 3. Law of imperfect obligations: They are not treated as orders because there is no sanction for them. Austin believes that to become law, a commandment must be accompanied by duty and punishment for its enforcement. According to Austin, the law is the order of the sovereign imposing an obligation that can be enforced by sanctions. The study and analysis of positive law is based on the law strictly applied by political superiors to political subordinates. Austin says, “Every law is an ordinance that imposes a duty imposed by sanction, but not all ordinances are laws.” Only the general command is a law.

However, Austin admits that there are three types of laws that are not ordinances, but may, exceptionally, be included in the scope of the law. The second problem is that most of the law we have derives from court decisions when legal issues have been raised. A very small part of the law actually consists of primary or delegated legislation. Therefore, law seems to develop from the solution of a problem and not from a “commandment”. 1. Declaratory/explanatory laws: These are not ordinances because they already exist and are only passed to explain the law that is already being enforced. The law as “an established rule to guide an intelligent being who has power over him. This can only be achieved by a specific person or body, because an indeterminate body cannot express desires in the form of commands. Austin was originally from Britain who developed the analytical school and also the father of the analytical school, but not the father. Austin opposed the traditional approach of legislating according to theories that law is guided by morality, religion, and God, separating morality from law.

According to Austin, “the law is the command of a ruler supported by sanctions.” Austin argues that laws are rules, which he defines as a kind of commandment. Specifically, laws are general orders given by a sovereign to members of an independent political society, supported by credible threats of sanctions or other negative consequences (“sanctions”) for non-compliance. The sovereign in any legal system is the person or group of people usually obeyed by the majority of the population, who usually obey no one. An order is a stated desire that something be done, expressed by a superior and accompanied by threats in case of non-compliance. Such commandments give rise to legal duties of obedience. It should be noted that all the key concepts in this report (right, sovereign, command, sanction, duty) are defined in terms of empirically verifiable social facts. According to Austin, no moral judgment is necessary to determine what the law is – although, of course, morality must be consulted to determine what the law should be. Austin, as a utilitarian, believed that laws should promote the greatest happiness of society. Some answers are available to those who would defend Austin.

First, some commentators have argued that Austin is misunderstood here, since he has always meant “by sovereign the office or institution embodying the highest authority; never the persons who hold that office or embody that institution at any given time” (Cotterrell 2003: p. 63, note omitted); there are certainly parts of the Austin lectures that support this reading (e.g., Austin 1832: Lecture V, pp. 128-29; Vorlesung VI, p. 218). When asked about the fundamental nature of law, Austin replied that laws (“proper”) are orders from a sovereign.